

Insider Threat Mitigation Project

A Dynamic Network Approach


Emergence of Threat – Ego centered analysis of specific cases

Approach:




- Semi-automated coding with fine-tuning to add dates
- Extract meta-networks one per year
- Comparison at “role” level
- Apply network analytics and visualization

Walker – Gang example

Case records/searches (open-source)



Manning – Lone Wolf example open-source




Findings on Insiders:

- Special characteristics
- Access
- Increasing betweenness
- Disrupted family network


Emergence of Threat – Email centered analysis of possible anomalies

Approach:


- Networks formed from meta-data
- One network per year
- Segment internal from internal-to-external communication
- Remove suspected distribution lists
- Identify “normal behavior” using Enron
- Develop pattern for “insiders” in contrast to “normal” using Enron
- Apply to anonymized SEI email



Enron core for 2001—Newman group coloring



SEI core for 2013—Newman group coloring



Findings on “Insiders”—those accused:

- Are not “top” network actors
- Form a densely connected sub-group
- High level of in-group communication
- Low out-group communication

Findings on SEI -v- Enron:

- SEI—more email, proportions similar
- Both—dominant dense core with numerous stars